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     One theory (weak central coherence) that accounts for a different 
perceptual-cognitive style in autism may suggest the possibility that 
individuals with autism are less likely to be affected by lexical knowledge 
on speech perception. This lexical context effects on speech perception 
has been evidenced by Ganong (1980) by using word-to-nonword 
identification test along a VOT dimension. This Ganong effect (which 
suggests that people tend to make their percept a real word) can be seen 
as one kind of central coherence. However, the boundary of the VOT 
contrast in Chinese is different from English, so the present study firstly 
explores the Ganong effect in Chinese and then adopts this effect in a 
neurotypical population of Chinese with different degrees of autistic traits 
in order to test the hypothesis. Seventeen graduate students of Chinese 
from Taiwan took part in the present experiment with the 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) as their index of autistic traits and 
word-to-nonword identification task (die2-tie2 and tiao2-diao2). Other 
factors, such as auditory sensitivity and slower lexical access that may 
potentially influence reduced lexical context effects in autism are 
considered. The result indicated that Ganong effect was significant in 
Chinese as well and an inverse relationship between the identification 
shift (Ganong effect) and one of the subsections of AQ (‘attention to 
detail’) was significant. The AQ score or word-to-nonword identification 
task did not correlate with scores on tasks (that examined auditory 
sensitivity and slower lexical access). It suggested that those extraneous 
factors can be ruled out. 
 vii
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background information 
    Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder  
characterized by a triad of deficits in socialization, communication and imagination 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Wing and Gould, 1979). Although genetic 
factors play an important role in autism (Smalley, et al., 1988), the diagnosis of autism 
is currently still made by behavioral criteria. Understanding the nature of cognitive 
processes that may cause these behaviors in autism has been one of the primary 
purposes of study on autism over the last decades. Many psychological accounts have 
appeared to provide potential explanations on the nature of autism. In recent decades, 
three accounts are noted to explain different aspects of autism: a theory-of-mind 
deficit (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1989b), executive 
dysfunction (Pennington and Ozonoff, 1996; Russell, 1997) and a weak central 
coherence (Frith, 1989b; Frith and Happé, 1994).  
       Taken these three separate psychological accounts together (theory of mind, 
executive dysfunction and weak central coherence), they have given us a better 
understanding of the nature of Autism Spectrum Disorder. For example, a 
theory-of-mind account suggests that autistic individuals have impairment in the 
development of social cognition and it can also explain many of the behavioral 
symptoms of autism in social, communicative and imaginative activities (Jarrold, 
Bulter, Cottington and Jimenez, 2000). Despite the fact that theory of mind hypothesis 
can account for many of a triad of deficits, it struggles to offer the explanation of 
some characteristics of autism: repetitive behaviors and a preference for stereotyped 
routines. Executive dysfunction has been proposed to explain this aspect of the 
impaired behaviors (Turner, 1997; Jarrold, 1997). This is the failure to regulate or 
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control one’s own acts so that autistic individuals reproduce repetitive behaviors and 
show bias for stereotyped routines. In addition, people with autism present more 
difficulties in switching from previous attention to anything else also due to this lack 
of control or regulation of behavior at will (Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers, 1991).    
     
In addition to those two psychological accounts (theory of mind and executive 
dysfunction) which characterize the aspects of a triad of impairments and control of 
action in autism, recent research has put its focus on an aspect of exceptional feature 
shown in autism: the assets in this disorder. People with autism present savant skills in 
math, music and drawing (Happé, 1999). One theory, weak central coherence (WCC) 
claims that these savant skills shown in autism result from their different 
perceptual-cognitive processing style. Individuals with autism tend to show a local 
bias for incoming information processing (Frith, 1989b). This preference for local 
bias becomes a superiority shown in autistic individuals when they are asked to do the 
tasks that require the detail-focusing processing; however, it would be the deficit 
when the tasks need the global meaning in context.    
Weak Central Coherence (WCC) has received a number of empirical evidence, 
including resilience to visual illusion (Happé, 1996), high rate of absolute pitch 
(Heaton, Hermelin and Pring, 1998) and high accuracy in Embedded Block Task 
(Shah and Frith, 1983). Weak Central Coherence has also been shown in linguistic 
tasks in which people with autism do not tend to use semantic context to decide the 
pronunciation of ambiguous homographs (Happé, 1997) or sentences (Jolliffe, 
Baron-Cohen, 1999). These existing findings imply that the local-context dissociation 
in lower-level linguistic processing, such as speech perception, may be found in 
people with autism as well. As for speech perception, it is notable to see that the 
knowledge of words has the influence on the perception of phoneme when listeners 
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listen to sounds. In other word, it suggests that lexical knowledge affects word 
perception. This top-down processing of lexical effects on phonetic categorization 
seems to be able to be regarded as one kind of central coherence.   
The renowned experimental paradigm that has been developed for supporting this 
is in Ganong (1980). In Ganong’s experiment, the result revealed that listeners shift 
their auditory categories to make the percept a real word (e.g. kiss vs. giss). This 
phenomenon occurred in speech perception is named ‘Ganong effect’. Ganong 
employed acoustic word-and-nonword continua varying in Voice Onset Time (VOT) 
in order to investigate this effect. For example, one continuum ranged between the 
word ‘dash’ and nonword ‘tash’, while the other used the word ‘task’ and nonword 
‘dask’. ‘Ganong effect’ is also considered to be a simple form of higher level 
linguistic processing that would influence the interaction between word level 
processing and phonetic level processing. This ‘Ganong effect’ has been evidenced in 
English, but it may raise a question about whether it is possible that lexical knowledge 
affects auditory word perception in Chinese Mandarin. Since lexical knowledge 
influences auditory word perception in English, it is assumed that this top-down 
phonetic processing appears in another language as well when perceiving ambiguous 
sounds of that certain language. However, due to the fact that the boundary of the 
VOT contrast in Chinese Mandarin is different from English, it needs to be 
investigated if this Ganong effect occurs in speech perception of Chinese.  
 
1.2 Aim and Focus of the study 
The present study aims to replicate and extend this Ganong effect on Chinese 
people with autistic traits. It will explore the Ganong effect in Chinese phonetic 
perception and investigate the degree to which lexical knowledge shift phonetic 
category a real word in individuals with varying degrees of autistic traits.  
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Participants are asked to take their Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) as the index of 
degrees of autistic traits (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin and Clubley, 
2001). Since the Ganong effect can be seen as a form of central coherence, a negative 
correlation between the Ganong effect and autistic traits is expected. Moreover, it may 
be the case that individuals with high autistic traits are connected to high auditory 
sensitivity and slower lexical access, both of which may lead to reduced lexical 
effects. Therefore, these extraneous factors that might attenuate lexical effect will also 
be considered.  
 
1.3 Research Question 
In this dissertation I will thus look into the following questions: 
1. Does context lexical effect (the Ganong effect) exist in Chinese phonetic 
perception? I will examine whether this effect can be found in Chinese native 
speakers, which would suggest that lexical knowledge of Chinese can bias their 
phonetic categorization. 
 
2. Is there a negative correlation between the Ganong effect and different degrees 
of autistic traits? That is, individuals with lower autistic traits may be more 
likely to be influenced by lexical status when asked to identify ambiguous 
stimuli, while people with higher autistic traits tend not to be affected by lexical 
status. 
 
3. Is there any difference in correlation between each subsection of AQ and context 
lexical effect? Since AQ test is composed of five subsections: ‘social skill’, 
‘attention switching’, ‘attention to detail’, ‘communication’ and ‘imagination’, I 
shall examine whether there is any difference in correlation from one another. 
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4. Do other extraneous factors influence lexical context effects on speech 
perception? I shall examine whether the auditory sensitivity and status of lexical 
knowledge might reduce lexical effect in people with autistic traits.  
 
1.4 Layout of the Dissertation 
   In the next chapter, I will review previous study of autism and present the 
underlying background that develops the present experiment. I shall introduce those 
potential accounts (theory of mind, executive dysfunction and weak central coherence) 
that explain the profile associated with Autism Spectrum Disorder. Of these three 
accounts, I will discuss the weak central coherence which suggests a phenomenon 
shown in autism that individuals with autism tend to have the preference for local bias. 
In other words, they are less likely to be affected by global / top-down processing. 
This present study sought to offer a potential test of this weak central coherence in the 
aspect of speech perception. I will present Ganong’s experiment, which is the 
fundament of designing the present experiment. The third chapter specifies the 
experiments that were administered for this research: methodology. The fourth chapter 
includes results and statistical analysis. Lastly, the fifth chapter will discuss the 
consequence of the experiments and provides the possible accounts. Then, I will 








2. Literature review 
In this section, I will provide a background about autism to the present 
study and examine how the underlying theories developed. I will firstly look at the 
previous research with different theories (theory of mind, executive dysfunction and 
weak central coherence) which illustrate different aspects of autism. Given the 
number of empirical evidence, it indicates that recently weak central coherence 
accounts for one peculiar nonsocial feature shown in autism: a different 
perceptual-cognitive style from normally developing people. This cognitive style in 
autism is regarded to result in both savant skills (in math, music and drawing) and 
deficits (in tasks that need detail-focused processing). It claims so because individuals 
with autism tend to show the preference for local bias in incoming information. The 
abundant empirical evidence from weak central coherence also suggests that 
local-context dissociation in lower-level linguistic processing, such as speech 
perception, may also be observed in people with autism too. In the following part of 
this literature review I will discuss that this process (i.e. context lexical effects 
previously demonstrated in Ganong’s experiment) can be seen as a form of central 
coherence.  
       
2.1 Theory-of-Mind (ToM)  
   It is believed that the success of the human social life relies on the ‘social 
intelligence’ (Frith and Frith 1999). One aspect of the social intelligence is the ability 
to understand others’ mental states (i.e. the ability of mind-read) and then alter 
behavior. Leslie (1987) proposed that this ‘metarepresentational’ capacity, such as 
appreciation of beliefs plays a critical role in the development of social skills. The 
deficit of theory of mind in autism has been developed out of this notion that 
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understanding the other’s mind is crucial in social life. However, individuals with 
autism fail to represent this mental states of others — the ability to understand 
others’ thoughts or feelings in order to predict their behaviors within the social 
communication (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg and Cohen, eds, 1993).  
Among some accounts of autism spectrum disorder, a Theory-of-Mind (ToM) 
deficit has been noticeably successful in explaining many of the impaired behavioral 
symptoms of autism in the social, communicative and imaginative development 
(Jarrold, Bulter, Cottington and Jimenez, 2000). For example, it is claimed that social 
withdrawal, which is a comprehensible result of lacking theory-of-mind, results in the 
inability to aware that beliefs and desires of others are different from his/her own 
(Baron-Cohen, 1989; Frith, Happé and Siddons, 1994). Thus, this inability to engage 
in metareprepresentation (Leslie, 1987) also decreases the motivation to communicate 
with others since the capacity to communicate needs the appreciation of others’ 
knowledge in order to be relevant within the conversation (Sperber and Wilson, 1986). 
Finally, a theory-of-mind deficit can also account for the imaginative impairment or at 
least pretend play since this skill requires the same representation of mental states of 
others.   
 This ability of representing others’ mental states has remarkably been tested by 
‘false belief’ (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, and 
Cohen, eds, 1993). Take the Sally-Anne task for example. The children are presented 
the scenario illustration that can be played by real people or puppets. When one 
character, Sally, leaves her ball in her basket and then goes away; the other character, 
Anne, moves this ball into her box. At the end of the test, the children are asked the 
question about where Sally should look for her ball when she comes back. Most 
normally developing children will respond the correct answer: it is in the basket, 
which represents what Sally really thinks. However, for most children with autism, 
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they may fail to understand others’ thinking and then answer that Sally will look for 
the ball in the box, where the ball really is. Therefore, this failure of understanding 
Sally’s mistaken belief has been regarded to be the evidence of a theory-of-mind 
deficit.  
    This mentalizing account has given us the understanding about the nature of the 
impairments in autism. Yet, the triad of impairments does not include some other 
features in autism (Frith and Happé, 1994). That is to say, the account of ToM 
struggles to provide explanations in some aspects of autistic behaviors, such as 
repetitive activities and preference for stereotyped routines (Russell, 1997; Jarrold, 
Bulter, Cottington and Jimenez, 2000). Therefore, it has been argued that executive 
dysfunction can account for this aspect of the impaired behaviors in autism (Turner, 
1997; Jarrold, 1997).  
 
 2.2 Executive Dysfunction 
In order to understand the reason why executive dysfunction has been provided 
the explanation of the impairments in autism, one has to know what ‘executive 
function’ is. Executive function refers to those high-level cognitive abilities that guide 
behavior to specified goals (Norman and Shallice, 1986). Besides, executive function 
has been defined by Welsh and Pennington (1988, p.201) as ‘the ability to maintain an 
appropriate problem-solving set for attainment of a future goal’. There is also a 
number of empirical evidence that suggests individuals with autism are often impaired 
on executive function (Hugh, Russell and Robbins, 1994; Ozonoff, Pennington and 
Rogers, 1991; Prior and Hoffman, 1990; Hugh and Russell, 1993; Onzonoff and 
Strayer, 2001).    
Researchers have been trying to specify these cognitive abilities of executive 
function, including planning, set-shifting, inhibiting automatic actions and holding a 
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mental representation on-line in working memory (Pennington, Bennetto, McAleer, 
and Roberts, 1996; Roberts and Pennington, 1996; Griffith, Pennington, Wehner and 
Rogers, 1999). Besides, those relevant researches also received empirical study in 
which they pointed out that those individuals with autism did show the deficits on the 
executive tasks that required the working memory, inhibition and set-shifting 
(Pennington, Bennetto, McAleer, and Roberts, 1996; Roberts and Pennington, 1996; 
Ozonoff, 1997; Ozonoff and Jensen, 1999; Ozonoff et al., 2004). Moreover, executive 
dysfunction is thought to be an alternative to some of the limitations of the 
theory-of-mind. Ozonoff, Rogers and Pennington (1991) indicated that in the 
experiment all of the subjects with autism/ Asperger’s syndrome were impaired on the 
typical tests of executive function: Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and Tower of Hanoi, 
whereas not every individual with autism/ Asperger’s syndrome fails in 
theory-of-mind task.    
    However, despite the fact that executive dysfunction offers the complementary 
account to theory-of-mind deficit, it still remains unclear whether executive 
dysfunction and theory-of-mind impairment are primary in autism (Russell, 1998). 
One peculiar nonsocial feature shown in autism that has been found in autism is that 
individuals with autism exhibit superior performance in math, music and drawing. It 
occurred in nearly one in ten people with autism (Rimland and Hill, 1984; Happé, 
1999) so that the other account, Weak Central Coherence (WCC) was therefore put 
forward by Frith (1989b; Frith and Happé, 1994).      
      
2.3 Weak central coherence 
The ‘central coherence’ was first defined by Frith (1989b) and the further 
extensive view was presented by Frith and Happé (1994) and Happé (1994a,b) too. 
Frith defined non-social features, ‘central coherence’, as an everyday tendency to 
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integrate the local incoming information for high-level meaning. It is a natural 
tendency to process on the whole rather than segmented parts of information. For 
example, Bartlett (1932) has proposed that people are likely to recall the gist of the 
story, whereas the detail is quickly lost and difficult to retain:  
 
[A]n individual does not normally take such a situation detail by detail… In all 
ordinary instances, he has an overmastering tendency simply to get a general 
impression of the whole; and, on the basis of this, he constructs the probable 
detail. (Bartlett, 1932, p. 206.)  
 
In addition, this preference of global processing is also shown in the young children 
and adults with non-autistic mental problems (Hermelin, O’connor, 1967), even in 
infants of three months old (Bhatt, Rovee-Collier and Shyi, 1994; Freedland and 
Dannemiller, 1996). 
Frith (1989b) and others suggested that this natural global information 
processing, in contrast, was disturbed in individuals with autism. The notion of the 
Weak Central Coherence theory is also similar to Kanner (1943), who named autism, 
in that the tendency for the detail-focused processing was clinically found in people 
with autism in relation to their resistance to change. Kanner viewed this common 
feature of autism as the ‘inability to experience wholes without full attention to the 
constituent parts’, a depiction that is similar to Weak Central Coherence theory 
proposed by Frith (Happé, 1999).  
In addition, Frith (1989b) also predicted that the lack of Central Coherence 
theory better applied to both excellent and poor performance in autism. That is, a 
weak drive for central coherence predicts the superiority shown by individuals with 
autism in the tasks that need the detail-focused processing, as contrasted to the deficits 
 10
where the tasks require the global meaning in context. In recent years, the weak 
central coherence has received empirical evidence from a number of sources. Those 
sources have been shown at different levels: perceptual coherence, 
visuospatial-constructional coherence and verbal-semantic coherence (Happé, 1999). 
Take the perceptual coherence deficit found in the previous tasks. For example, Happé 
(1996) suggested that individuals with autism succumb to the misperception to a 
lesser degree. In this test, individuals with autism were asked to discriminate the 
differences within the standard visual illusions. Some of those illusions can be divided 
into a ‘to-be-judged’ figure and inducing context. The hypothesis would be that if 
individuals with autism tend to focus more on featural parts, they may succumb to 
those visual illusions to a lesser degree. The consequence indicated that the group of 
the participants with autism concentrated more on the to-be-judged parts without 
integrating them within the whole illusion-inducing figure. It seems individuals with 
autism relatively do not succumb to visual illusions.  
Similarly, other studies also presented the same bias of the local-level processing 
at the perceptual level. Jarrold and Russell (1997) investigated whether individuals 
with autism would quickly count dots that were presented in a canonical form or they 
would enumerate dots independently to get the sum. The result suggested that 
decreased benefit from canonical form in autism supported the previous hypothesis in 
autism. Heaton, Hermelin and Pring (1998), on the other hand, also suggested one 
excellent skill in perceptual level: absolute pitch. Heaton and others presented their 
participants the notes of individual pitches; the musically naive individuals with 
autism were better than the controls at the capacity of underlying absolute pitches. 
Gepner, Mestre, Masson and de Schonen (1995) have shown that basic movement 
perception in autism is impaired and different from the normal controls; namely, 
attenuated susceptibility to visual motion can be observed in autistic individuals. 
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Moreover, the McGurk effect, the influence of the visual over the auditory perception 
is smaller in autism (de Gelder, Vroomen and Van, 1991).    
   At visuospatial-constructional level of coherence, Shah and Frith (1983) 
found that individuals with both high- and low-functioning autism were more accurate 
on the Embedded Figures Test (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin and Karp, 1971). In this test, 
children are asked to distinguish individual shapes, such as a triangle (Tent) and a 
triangle attached to the top of the rectangle (House) in cut-out cardboard models. The 
result showed that the mean score of the autistic group was 21 out of 25, while the 
other two controls got 15 or less; that is, children with autism excelled at searching 
these individual shapes, Tent and House, which are regarded to be the low-level part 
of the models embedded in the high-level and coherent cut-out cardboard models. In 
addition, the Wechsler Block Design task (Wechsler, 1974, 1981) is regarded to be the 
test on which individuals with autism have excellent performance. This block-design 
task, first invented by Kohs (1923), requires constructing each whole figure into 
constituent units as quickly as possible. However, it is difficult for most of the people 
to break up the design into separate or logic segments since most of people have the 
strong tendency to see the design as a whole or Gestalt. Shah and Frith (1993) support 
this asset found in autism that the superior performance is also shown on their 
Wechsler Block Design task and individuals with autism are less aided by the 
pre-segmentation of the designs, while non-autistic subjects benefit from 
pre-segmented design condition. This is also akin to Embedded Figure Test (Shah and 
Frith, 1983) that individuals with autism do not succumb to the gestalt. Furthermore, 
the weak drive for central coherence has also been presented in a savant study that 
shows EC’s talented three-dimensioned drawing of objects (Mottron and Belleville, 
1993). On around ten tasks, this artist with autism, E.C., demonstrated his 
detail-focused method of drawing style. It was observed that a professional artist as a 
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control started to draw by constructing the outlines and then focus on the details. As 
opposed to this professional artist, E.C. ‘began his drawing by a secondary detail and 
then processed by adding contiguous elements’ and presented ‘no privileged status of 
global form…but rather a construction by local progression’. Due to E.C.’s extreme 
precision for graphic details, it was therefore concluded that the lack of the 
hierarchization in E.C. prevents him from global interference and results in a benefit 
in precision (Mottron and Belleville, 1993). The other extensive experiment on 
outstanding drawing style, including copying of impossible figures is also shown by 
Mottron, Belleville and Menard (1999).   
Individuals with autism are thought to have difficulty in appreciating ‘meaning’ 
in terms of verbal-semantic level (Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 1999). Prior and Hall 
(1979) showed that the comprehension of phrases is weak in the individuals with 
autism, while their comprehension of single words is intact. Additionally, people with 
autism tend to get lower scores on reading comprehension than reading accuracy 
scores (Loker and Rutter, 1969; Frith and Snowling, 1983). Hermelin and O’Connor 
(1967) demonstrated that autistic people do not benefit from meaning in memory 
tasks. The same phenomenon is also supported by Tager-Flusberg (1991) that autistic 
people tend not use semantic cues, nor the grammatical relations. Difficulty in 
appreciating meaning has also been found in homographs (Frith and Snowling, 1983). 
Homographs stand for words with one spelling, two meanings and two pronunciations 
and one must integrate the meaning of the whole sentence in order to get the context 
appropriate pronunciation of the last word: “In her eye there was a big tear”; “In her 
dress there was a big tear”. Thus, if people with autism are weak at central coherence, 
then words within the sentences would be read like unconnected words and the 
context can not help for disambiguating the homographs at the end of the sentence. 
Frith and Snowling (1983) and other related studies with high-functioning children 
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and adult (Happé, 1997) do suggest that individuals with autism tend not to employ 
preceding-sentence context to decide the pronunciation of homographs. Findings such 
as these are similar to Kanner’s depiction of his previous cases (1943): ‘…the 
children read monotonously, and a story… is experienced in unrelated portions rather 
than its coherent totality’.  
So far, these results indicated that autistic individuals tend to use the analytical or 
local, rather than the global processing and the rate of the semantic information 
employed within a context is much less in people with autism. Since findings suggest 
that the effects are obvious in the areas where the top-down semantic cues are 
important, the present study would like to focus on another lower level linguistic 
processing, speech perception, where its top-down influence of lexical knowledge has 
been evidenced (Ganong, 1980). One prediction would be that local-context 
dissociation in speech perception may be shown in autistic people as well.          
              
2.4 Ganong effect 
2.4.1 Biasing Effect of Words in Speech Perception 
   Linguistic context has long been known to influence speech processing. Take 
Miller, Heise and Lichten (1951) for example. They demonstrated that the words that 
can form sentences are easier for people to identify in noise. Warren (1970) also 
pointed out the phoneme restoration effect, which says that context can bias the 
perception of the segmented sounds. That is, when a segmented sound of a word is 
replaced by noise, participants are less likely to notice this change. This biasing effect 
has been proposed to occur both in previous and following context (Warren and 
Sherman, 1974). In addition to the semantic effect of words in the sentences, the 
frequency of word’s use also takes part in the identification of speech perception. 
Broadbent (1967) showed that the word-frequency effect is significantly presented in 
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the identification of speech perception in noise. Ganong (1980) demonstrated, instead, 
the influence on the identification of phonetic categorization of a rather lower-level 
linguistic aspect, lexical status of a phonetic sequence. 
2.4.2 The Underlying Theory and Result of Ganong’s Experiment     
It has been well accepted that there is a stage of processing word perception that 
phonetic categorization is getting involved. Liberman, Harris, Hoffman and Griffith 
(1957) once used the synthesized stop consonants and indicated that listeners can 
easily discriminate those stimuli only when those are belonging to the different 
phonetic categories. Stimuli of the same phonetic categories were also proposed to be 
quite difficult for listeners to discriminate. This was so-called ‘categorical 
perception’.  
An auditory continuum between different stop consonants has been tested on 
the basis of categorical perception. Voice Onset Time (VOT), acting as an auditory 
cue for voicing in syllabic-initial stop consonants and existing in many languages 
(Lisker and Abramson, 1964), is known to distinguish one stimulus from the other 
within auditory continua. Perception of an acoustic continuum is usually characterized 
by labeling numbers. For example, the phoneme boundary of‘d’ and‘t’ is about 35 
msec VOT with the ‘da-ta’ continuum to an English native speaker (Ganong, 1980). 
Therefore, an English native speaker would regard stimuli with VOT of greater 40 
msec as‘t’ sound, while consider stimuli with VOT of less than 30 to be‘d’ sound.   
     Based on this VOT dimension, Ganong (1980) employed word-to-nonword 
(and vice versa) continua to investigate if there is a lexical bias to make the percept a 
real word rather than a nonword; that is, there is a lexical effect on altering VOT 
perception of words. Take two combined continua as stimuli in his experiment for 
example. Ganong used one continuum, ranging from the word ‘dash’ to the nonword 
‘tash’; another one was the continuum between the word ‘dask’ and the nonword 
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‘task’. The effect of the opposite direction is therefore predicted since‘d’ is the word 
in the former continua, whereas it is not in the latter one. Participants were asked to 
respond whether they head was‘d’,‘t’ or ‘g’, ‘k’ when listening to stimuli. The result 
indicated that listeners shifted their identification along a VOT dimension to make 
phonetic categorization a real word.    
 
2.5 Conclusion of Literature Review 
     In first part of this chapter I have discussed the autism spectrum disorder and its 
empirical work within different theories: theory-of-mind deficit, executive 
dysfunction and weak central coherence. The literature reviewed above has revealed 
that weak central coherence (WCC) is able to account for the nonsocial feature in 
autism: a different perceptual-cognitive style from normally developing people. This 
different perceptual-cognitive style in autism would become an asset when the task 
required detail-focused processing, whereas it would be a deficit when the task asked 
global processing. Weak Central Coherence has also received a number of empirical 
evidence, from which has led to the suggestion that individuals with autism may show 
local-context dissociation in lower-level linguistic processing, such as speech 
perception. That is to say, Ganong effect (1980) (such a top-down lexical effect on 
speech perception) may be less likely to occur in people with autism.         
      
The present study will focus on this Ganong effect in Chinese phonetic 
perception and examine it on the Chinese individuals with “autistic traits”.  
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin and Clubley (2001) developed a 
self-administrated and short scale, Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ), for 
distinguishing the degree to which normally developing individual has ‘autistic traits’. 
It is due to the continuum view of social communication disability in autism that the 
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difference between autism and normality is the degree of the social communication 
disability (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith, 1991; Wing, 1981, 1988); therefore, it has been 
considered to be a useful test in that both normal individuals or people with autism 
can be diagnosed in this same manner. Since the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) was 
designed to identify the autistic traits of both individuals with autism and those in 
general populations, it suggests the possibility of using AQ in the present study. 
Additionally, it is also due to the notion of WCC that the tendency of using local and 
global processing is regarded to be a different style rather than a deficit (Happé, 1999; 
Happé and Frith, 2006); therefore, the fundamental mechanism associated with weak 
central coherence in autism should also keep within neurotypucal individuals. 
Therefore, Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) will be used for a predictor of autistic 
traits in the current experiment. 
2.5.1 Implications of the Experiment 
     According to context lexical effects on speech perception based on Ganong 
effect (1980), the result that lexical effect is reduced in people with autism would 
confirm WCC, suggesting that this top-down auditory processing influences speech 
perception in individuals with high autistic traits. It is also possible that the different 
subsections of AQ test (i.e. social skill, attention switching, attention to detail, 
communication and imagination) will show different degree of correlation with 
lexical effect, which may be displaying the question as to why different aspects of 
autistic traits are more likely to influence the lexical effects on speech perception. If 
the decreased lexical effect is not found in people with higher autistic traits, it could 
be assumed that autistic traits may not affect the way people perceive sounds. If so, 
the possibility that the lack of context lexical effects is due to the limitation of the 
methodology in the present experiment should be considered.  
However, if it is indeed found the reduced lexical effects in people with higher 
 17
autistic traits, additional factors that could cause the attenuated lexical effect in 
phonetic processing, which is characterized by high AQ individuals, should be 
considered: high auditory sensitivity, slower lexical access. First, it is probable that 
high AQ individuals may hold high auditory sensitivity so that this strong phonetic 
discrimination capability makes them free from lexical effects. Thus, participants’ 
phonetic discrimination capacity is going to be examined. Second, it may be that high 
AQ is linked to slower lexical access, which may lead to the reduced lexical effects of 
stimuli. To examine this possibility, a lexical decision task is used to test participants’ 
language status. In sum, these two extraneous factors (high auditory sensitivity and 
slower lexical access) are also going to be examined, along with the main Ganong 
effect, in order to confirm potential effects from these two extraneous factors on 

















     This study was a replication and extension of that by Ganong (1980), which is 
going to be applied and tested in Chinese Mandarin. The method includes 
word-to-nonword continuum identification which examines lexical effects on speech 
perception through participants’ identification of sounds.  
According to Ganong (1980), the different length of VOT is manipulated in 
order to form the continua from word to nonword. VOT stands for the length of voice 
onset region that ranges from the release of a stop to the onset of the vowel. Stops in 
Chinese Mandarin have the features of aspiration in which it is usually measured by 
Voice Onset Time as well. Additionally, voice onset time of voiceless consonant‘t’ is 
acoustically longer than that of voiced consonant‘d’ in English (Ganong, 1980), while 
it is similar in Chinese Mandarin that voice onset time of aspirated ‘t’ is also longer 
than that of unaspirated ‘d’. Besides, Chinese Mandarin is a tone language (four 
tones), in which one word contains one syllable and meaning. Unlike other intonation 
language, same sounds with different tones alter meanings of words in Chinese (ma1: 
‘mother’, ma2: ‘trouble’, ma3: ‘horse’ and ma4: ‘scold’). The same tone within the 
word-to-nonword pair is going to be under controlled. Therefore, only the initial stops 
within the word-to-nonword pair are different (die2 vs. tie2).  
Other potential factors, auditory sensitivity discrimination and lexical 
knowledge (by nonword ABX discrimination and auditory lexical decision task 
respectively) that may influence lexical effects on speech perception in high AQ 
individuals are going to be examined. Also, the possibility of influence from 





This experiment tested Chinese native speakers from Taiwan. The independent 
variables were total scores of AQ, five sub-sectional scores of AQ, while the 
dependent variable was context lexical effect (Ganong effect). The results and 
statistical analysis are presented in the following chapter.    
 
3.2 Participants and general procedure 
     Twenty-three graduate students of Chinese native speakers from Taiwan at 
Edinburgh University took part in this present experiment. They ranged in age from 
24 years to 37 years. There were 18 females and 5 males in this experiment. Their 
general proficiency in English is good (ielts 6.5-7). All participants were given 
word-to- nonword identification, an ABX discrimination test, lexical decision task and 
pen-and-paper AQ test. Since one participant failed to complete the entire AQ test and 
other five replied what they heard was neither‘d’ or‘t’ for some stimuli, results from 
17 participants are going to be analyzed (13 females and 4 males). The further details 
of those tasks are illustrated as follows.  
 
3.3 Word-to-nonword continuum identification 
The integration of lexical knowledge and phonetic information is going to be 
explored through the Ganong effect. In Ganong’s experiment (1980), the results 
indicated that lexical status influences listeners’ discrimination of sounds by a VOT 
dimension. For example, Ganong employed nonword-to-word ‘dask vs. task’ and 
word-to-nonword ‘dash vs. tash’ in which those two continua only differ in the last 
consonant(s). I adopted Ganong’s method and chose four words in Chinese Mandarin 
for two pairs: real word, die2 (to pile) vs. nonword tie2; real word, tiao2 (to adjust) vs. 
nonword, diao2. Then, those two minimal pairs (word-nonword) in Chinese Mandarin 
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(die2 vs. tie2; tiao2 vs. diao2) were manipulated by their VOT to form the seven-step 
continua, ranging from die2 to tie2 and tiao2 to diao2. Then, participants decided 
whether they heard /t/ or /d/ within those 7-step continua. In this task, we expect that 
listeners will tend to show higher /d/ identification in the die2(word)-tie2(nonword) 
continuum and higher /t/ identification in the diao2(nonword)-tiao2(word) continuum. 
But this bias will be weaker in listeners with high AQ. 
3.3.1 Material   
Those tokens used in the present experiment were read by a Taiwanese female 
and they were recorded at a rate of 48 kHz. Due to the fact that mainlanders, 
monolinguals in Taiwan, speak quite well-accepted Chinese Mandarin, this female 
descendant of mainlanders is elected to be the talker of the present experiment. Two 
word-to-nonword VOT continua were produced by cross-splicing spoken tokens of 
‘die2’ vs. ‘tie2’ and ‘tiao2’ vs. ‘diao2’ through the wave analysis software, Praat. As 
for manipulating VOT dimensions to form seven-step continua, what was first to do 
was to replace the first initial 100 ms parts of ‘tie2’ and ‘die2’ by those of ‘tiao2’ and 
‘diao2’ respectively in order to make the initial acoustic parts of those endpoint pairs 
the same. Then, those endpoint pairs started to be cross spliced to form two equal 
7-step continua from die2 to tie2 and diao2 to tiao2. Firstly, VOT of ‘tiao2’ was 
measured as 84.247 ms and that of ‘diao2’ was calculated as 19.291ms (see Figure 1). 
After measuring these two, VOT of ‘tiao2’ was going to subtract that of ‘diao2’ and 
the result was 64.956 ms. Therefore, each VOT step was approximately 10.826 ms 
when the result (64.956 ms) was divided into 6. The VOTs of each stimulus are 
presented in Table 1. To make the second stimulus, the initial 30.117 ms proportion of 
‘diao2’ was replaced by the initial 30.117 ms proportion of ‘tiao2’. The following 
third to sixth stimuli were produced in the same way. Some minor adjustments were 
made in order to make splicing at zero-crossings. Next, the same procedure of making 
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7-step continuum was applied to the other word-to-nonword continuum (die2 vs. tie2). 
Before those stimuli were mounted to E-Prime and randomly played on the computer, 
they should be converted into 22 kHz.  
 
     Table 1: Stimuli for the identification task 
Stimuli VOT (ms) 
          1 19.291 
          2 30.117 
3 40.943 









Figure 1: Spectrogram showing that the voice onset time (VOT) of ‘die2’/ ‘diao2’ 





Participants were instructed to listen to those stimuli and to circle ‘d’ or ‘t’ on the 
answer sheets in order to respond what they heard from those fourteen stimuli. After 
participants finished answering each question by circling‘d’ or ‘t’, they pressed the 
‘enter’ key to continue the next stimulus. Each stimulus was randomly played for four 
times within a block and after completing one block, participants could take a little 
break as they want until they were ready for the next block. In total, participants 
listened to two blocks for this task. Therefore, each stimulus was presented for eight 
times in this identification task. 
 
3.4 Nonword ABX discrimination 
   A reduced lexical effect could results from a possible factor that high auditory 
sensitivity may lead to strong discrimination capacities that make people with high 
AQ free from lexical effect. Although definitive evidence has not been confirmed in 
support of such auditory sensitivity in people with autism, this potential factor is still 
chosen to be examined. In order to rule out the case that speech perception is 
influenced by lexical effect so that the individuals with high AQ were less likely to 
present their real auditory sensitivity, nonwords in Chinese were used as stimuli. That 
is, the possible auditory sensitivity was going to be tested by participants’ phonetic 
discrimination with nonword-to-nonword continuum. Two nonwords (diu2 and tiu2) 
in Chinese Mandarin were elected to be the stimuli. I adopted ABX discrimination 
where participants decided the third sound they heard was the same as the first or the 
second one that was previously played.  
3.4.1 Material 
    A seven-step nonword continuum was produced by cross-splicing naturally 
spoken tokens of ‘diu2’ and ‘tiu2’ using the wave analysis program, Praat as well. The 
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initial proportions and the tone of ‘diu2’ and ‘tiu2’ were similar to those in 
word-to-nonword identification task (die2 vs. tie2; diao2 vs. tiao2). That is, what the 
difference between them is only the last segment. Similarly, this nonword-to-nonword 
continuum was firstly created by cross-splicing. VOT of ‘diu2’ was measured as 
19.712 ms and that of ‘tiu2’ was 71.249 ms. Next, VOT of ‘tiu2’ was going to minus 
that of ‘diu2’ and the result was 51.537 ms. In order to get each length of VOT within 
a seven-step continuum, the result (51.537 ms) was divided into six (for seven steps). 
The VOTs of the stimuli are given in Table 2. For making the second stimulus, the 
length of 28.301 ms (see the table 2 ) from the very beginning of ‘d’ (in ‘diu2’) was 
first measured and then this length (28.301 ms) should be deleted. See parallel 
passage above. The following third to sixth stimuli were produced in the same way. 
Some minor adjustments were made in order to make splicing at zero-crossings.  
 
    Table 2: Stimuli for the nonword ABX discrimination 
       Stimuli       VOT (ms) 












    Participants were asked to listen to those 7 stimuli randomly played on the 
computer and wrote down ‘1’ or ‘2’ on the answer sheet. There were three sounds for 
each question and participants would first hear two different stimuli and then they 
were asked to respond whether the third stimulus they head was identical to the first 
or second stimulus. This task comprised two blocks. After finishing the first block, 
participants were allowed to take a rest and to continue the next block when they were 
ready by pressing the ‘enter’ key. In each block, all four permutations of the six sets 
of ABX stimuli were randomly given once (eg. step1-step2-step1; step1-step2-step2; 
step2-step1-step1; step2-step1-step2). Therefore, there were 48 questions within these 
two blocks and each set of ABX stimuli was thus examined eight times.  
3.5 Auditory lexical decision 
   Lastly, there is the possibility that high AQ is linked to slower lexical access, 
which may attenuate lexical effects on speech perception. Language delay is often 
observed in children with autism, so it is also assumed that the underlying 
mechanisms in autism are likely to influence the ability of process words. To test this 
possibility, a lexical decision task was administered.          
3.5.1 Material 
    The forty-eight tokens of words and nonwords were read by a Taiwanese female. 
Half of those stimuli (twenty-four) were formed to be similar with the 
word-to-nonword pairs employed in the identification task. They were word-nonword 
minimal pairs where the place of articulation, the voice/ voiceless and tones within 
each minimal pairs were controlled (see the table 3 below). The rest of the stimuli 
(twenty-four) were fillers. Half of those fillers were other real words and the other 
half were nonwords (see the table 4 below).  
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 Table 3  Stimuli for the auditory lexical decision task 
 
Real word Nonword 
pian2 (‘便’宜) the first 
one of the bound word, 
‘cheap’ 
bian2 
ping2 (瓶)‘a bottle’ bing2 
bie2 (別)‘don’t’ pie2 
ba3 (把)‘the handle’ pa3 
tiao2 (調)‘to adjust’ diao2  
tui3 (腿)‘legs’ dui3 
die2 (疊)‘a pile of 
(paper, etc.)’  
tie2 
diu1 (丟)‘to throw’ tiu1 
ka3 (卡)‘cards’ ga3 
kui2(‘葵’花) the first 
one of the bound word 
‘sunflower’ 
gui2 
gui4 (貴) ‘expensive’ kui4 






Table 4  Stimuli for the auditory lexical decision task (Fillers) 
 
             Fillers 
Real word Nonword 
ji2 (吉) ‘luck’  bia2 
tong4 (痛) ‘hurt’ piu2 
sian3 (想) ‘to think’ gi2 
dui4 (對) ‘yes’ gian4 
gui4 (貴) ‘expensive’ kia4 
zha4 (炸) ‘to explode’ tiu2 
nian2 (年) ‘year’ kian4 
fei1 (飛) ‘to fly’ biu2 
ting2 (停) ‘to wait’ pia2 






kai1 (開) ‘to open’ tuang3 
 
3.5.2 Procedure 
     Participants were asked to listen to those forty-eight stimuli and to respond 
whether the stimulus they heard was real word or not by pressing ‘1’(for real words) 
or ‘2’ (for nonwords) on stimulus response box (SRB). They were also instructed in 
advance that those would be real words only if those were in Chinese Mandarin (not 
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in any other dialect used in Taiwan). They were also informed that they should press 
the bottom ‘1’ or ‘2’ as soon as they got the answer on mind. Since most of the 
participants replied after finishing that a few of nonwords were legal words for them 
in their dialect, an additional questionnaire was designed to confirm whether their 
accuracy on this task would be affected by their own dialects.  
3.6 Questionnaire 
This was an on-line questionnaire, which participants were asked to fill in after  
taking part in the experiment. The forty-eight words (spelling in Zuyin system, eg. 
“ㄎㄧㄚˋ”  for ‘kia4’) in the questionnaire were those stimuli of lexical decision 
task. They were also requested to mention in this questionnaire about what their own 
dialects are. As for the answering method, there were two options (‘this is a word’, 
and ‘this is not a word’) for participants to choose for each word by ticking the box 
belonging to each option. They were informed to send it back when they completed.  
3.7 AQ test 
This was a pen-and-paper test of a Chinese Mandarin version. Participants 
were requested to do in the end of the experiment. There are fifty questions in AQ test 
in which it is composed of five subsections: social skill, attention switching, attention 
to detail, communication and imagination; therefore, each subsection contains ten 
questions randomly occurred in the test (e.g. for social skill: ‘I prefer do things with 
others rather than on my own’ or ‘I find it easy to work out what someone is thinking 
or feeling just by looking at their face’; for attention switching: ‘I prefer to do things 
the same way over and over again’ or ‘In a social group, I can easily keep track of 
several different people’s conversations’; for attention to detail: ‘I often notice small 
sounds when others do not’ or ‘I usually concentrate more on the whole picture rather 
than on the small details’; for communication: ‘Other people frequently tell me that 
what I’ve said is impolite, even though I think it is polite’ or ‘I know how to tell if 
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someone listening to me is getting bored’; for imagination: ‘When I am reading a 
story, I can easily imagine what the characters might look like’ or ‘When I am reading 
a story, I find it difficult to work out the characters’ intentions’). For each question, 
there are four options: ‘definitely agree’, ‘slightly agree’, ‘slightly disagree’ and 
‘definitely disagree’. Half of the items are described to produce a ‘disagree’ reply and 
half of them are worded to answer an ‘agree’ response in order to avoid biasing in 
either way. Participants scored in the range from 0 to 50 after the results were 
calculated by hand.    
3.8 Predictions 
My predictions were: 
1. Since it has been a well known phenomenon in speech perception that context 
lexical knowledge has influence on phonetic categorization, a Ganong effect 
is also expected to be found in these two word-to-nonword continua of 
Chinese Mandarin. 
2. Since Ganong effect can be viewed as a form of weak central coherence in 
processing, a varying degree of Ganong effect is predicted among individuals 
with different autistic traits. Additionally, there will be a negative correlation 
between lexical effects and AQ scores. That is to say, individuals with lower 
AQ will achieve higher lexical effects, while people with higher AQ are going 
to present fewer lexical effects.  
3. Those other potential factors, such as nonword ABX discrimination and 
auditory lexical effect are not expected to be correlated with Ganong effect 
and AQ test.  





      I shall present the results by each experiment: first I will provide the results 
from the word-to-nonword continuum identification then I will give the results from 
nonword ABX discrimination. Next, the results from auditory lexical decision task 
will be presented including their reply to the questionnaire. Finally, I shall provide a 
discussion of each experiment.  
4.1 Word-to-nonword continuum identification   
      In this experiment, participants were asked to circle‘d’ or ‘t’ in response to the 
beginning of the sound they heard. Therefore, I shall see the number of response‘d’ 
for example within these 112 sounds (each stimulus repeated eight times). Presumably, 
the number of‘d’ was higher on one word-to-nonword continuum (die2 vs. tie2) than 
another nonword-to-word (diao2 vs. tiao2) and the correlation between AQ score and 
lexical effects are observed.   
 
4.1.1  Results from a repeated measures ANOVA (the analysis of variance) 
Results from a repeated measure ANOVA on the mean proportion of‘d’  
response indicated a significant main effect of continuum, p= .035 and a main effect 
of step, p= .000 (see Table 5). The interaction between the two sources did not 
(p= .479). That is, the effect of the mean proportion of‘d’ responses between the 
continua through the steps is not significant. But, those two significant main effects 
indicate that the different mean proportion of‘d’ responses between two continua and 
seven steps are observed. As demonstrated by Figure 2, the proportion of‘d’ response 
was higher in die2-tie2 continuum than in the diao2-tiao2 continuum. This suggests 
that the context lexical effects (Ganong effect) are indeed observed in Chinese 




Table 5: Source of variance due to two continua (die2-tie2 vs. diao2-tiao2) and 
steps (seven steps for each continuum) 
 
Source df MS F p 
Continuum 1    .520    5.329   .035 
Step     6    4.851   134.047   .000 
Continuum × Step     6    1.558     .729   .479 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean proportion of‘d’ responses for two continua 
 
 
4.1.2 Results from the correlations 
In this test, the correlations between total AQ score and context lexical effects  
are examined as well as the correlations between five subsections of AQ and lexical 
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effects. As for the lexical effects, the mean identification shift between the two 
continua was log-transformed. The correlation between total AQ score and log mean 
shift does not show a significant result (r= .091, N= 17, p= .730). Then, what should 
be tested are the other correlations of five subsections (see Table 6). Among those 
subsections, ‘attention to details’ shows the inverse correlation with log mean shift (r= 
-4.89, p= .047＊, n= 17). However, there is no significant relationship among the 
other four (see Table 6). In order to look into this discrepancy between ‘attention to 
detail’ and other rest of the subsections (i.e. ‘social skill’, ‘attention switching’, 
‘communication’ and ‘imagination’) of AQ, the relationship between each subsection 
need to be examined (see Table 7).      
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           Table 7: Correlations between each subsection of AQ 
  












































5     .724** 
P= .001 
N= 17 
1= ‘social skill’; 2= ‘communication’; 3= ‘imagination’; 4= ‘attention to 
detail’; 5= ‘attention switching’; 6= total AQ score  
4.1.3 Discussion 
The word-to-nonword continuum identification task failed to find out the  
significant correlation between log mean shift and total AQ score. However, a 
negative significant correlation between ‘attention to details’, one of the five 
subsections of AQ, is observed. One explanation for this significant correlation is that 
Ganong effect (the context lexical effect) requires integration between lexical 
knowledge and auditory information, and the high tendency of focusing on details is 
less likely to facilitate this phonetic integration. Therefore, a negative correlation is 
significant in the aspect of ‘attention to details’. Additionally, every subsection, except 
‘attention to detail’, is highly positively correlated to total AQ score, indicating that 
when those four subsections (‘social skill’, ‘communication’, ‘imagination’, ‘attention 
switching’) increase /decrease, they will influence the increase/ decrease of the total 
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AQ score. On the other hand, the degree of ‘attention to detail’ can not affect the total 
AQ score according to the statistical result in this present experiment. Moreover, 
‘attention to detail’ is not correlated to any other four subsections, while most of those 
four subsections have positive correlations with each other. Further explanation is 
presented in the chapter 5 (general discussion and conclusion).  
4.2 Nonword ABX discrimination 
       In this task, participants were asked to circle ‘1’ or ‘2’ in order to respond 
when the third stimulus they hear was identical to the first or the second sound. I shall 
see the accuracy they got among forty-eight questions by calculating the number of 
the correct answers. 
4.2.1 Correlation between nonword ABX discrimination and context lexical 
effects 
The result of correlation between discrimination and log mean shift indicates  
that a significant correlation between them is not observed (r= .299, p= .244, n= 17).      
 
4.2.2 Correlation between nonword ABX discrimination and AQ test 
   The result of correlation between discrimination and total AQ score suggests that a 
significant correlation between them is not found (r= -.017, p= .947, n= 17).   
 
4.2.3 Correlation between nonword ABX discrimination and ‘attention to detail’  
Since it may be possible that high auditory discrimination is due to attention 
to sounds, which is assumed to be related to the underlying mechanism of ability to 
pay attention to detail occurred in autism, the correlation between nonword 
discrimination and ‘attention to detail’ has opted to examine. The result of correlation 
between discrimination and ‘attention to detail’ points out that a significant 
correlation between them is not found (r= -.238, p= .357, n= 17).   
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4.2.4 Discussion 
The correlations either between the nonword discrimination and log mean  
shift (lexical effects) or between the nonword discrimination and total AQ score are 
not found. That is, auditory sensitivity may not influence context lexical effects when 
listeners perceive sounds. However, since one subsection, ‘attention to detail’, is 
correlated to lexical context effect in the present study, we should pay attention to the 
relationship between ‘attention to detail’ and this subsection of AQ (‘attention to 
detail’). The result indicates that there is no significant relationship between them (r= 
-.238, p= .357, n= 17). It may be argued that the underlying mechanism of high 
phonetic discrimination is related to the ability of paying attention to details, and then 
the correlation between them should be seen. One explanation for this discrepancy 
would be that individuals with more autistic traits may not hold high auditory 
discrimination, but high autistic people tend to pay more attention to details, whether 
in visual or auditory aspects. In other words, the tendency of paying attention to detail 
may not be relevant to the excellent ability of auditory discrimination. Therefore, it 
can be seen that the result indicated that there is no significant correlation between 
nonword discrimination and attention to details. It suggests the degree of paying 
attention to details is significantly affected by different autistic traits, while the degree 
of auditory discrimination is not.   
 
4.3 Auditory lexical decision 
In this task, participants were asked to press ‘1’ for words or ‘2’ for  
nonwords on the stimulus response box (SRBOX) in order to examine their accuracy 
and reaction time. I shall view the correlation between the accuracy of those questions 
and log mean shift/ total AQ score, as well as the correlation between the reaction 
time for answering those questions and log mean shift/ total AQ score. The 
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questionnaire is also examined to see if participants’ dialects influence their decision 
of nonword. 
4.3.1 Correlation between auditory lexical decision and lexical effects 
Two aspects, accuracy and reaction time are tested to see if  
they are correlated to lexical effects. The result of correlation between accuracy and 
‘attention to detail’ suggests that a significant correlation between them is not found 
(r= -.252, p= .329, n= 17). In addition, the reaction time is not correlated to log mean 
shift (r= -.102, p= .697, n= 17) 
 
4.3.2 Correlation between auditory lexical decision and AQ test 
Similarly, the correlation between accuracy/ reaction time and total AQ score  
were examined. The result indicates that no significant correlation between accuracy 
and total AQ score was found (r= -.289, p= .260, n= 17); furthermore, the 
phenomenon is the same in the reaction time and total AQ score (r= .269, p= .296, n= 
17). Finally, the relationship between accuracy/ reaction time and one aspect of AQ, 
‘attention to detail’, do not indicate the significant relationship between them.  
 
4.3.3 Possible influences on decision of nonwords in the lexical decision task 
from participants’ own dialects 
Their accuracy in nonword should be considered first before examining the  
potential influences from dialects. The result indicates that their nonword accuracy is 
quite high (5 errors at most among those 24 nonwords) and although they did not get 
the correct response to some nonword (for example, ‘tie2’) in lexical decision task, 
they chose the correct answer for those nonword in the questionnaire. Since any 
intended nonwords were identified as real words in the offline task (the questionnaire), 
it is assumed that the dialects may not affect their judgment in the online task (the 
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lexical decision task).  
 
4.3.4  Discussion  
        Lexical knowledge is another factor that may cause the reduced lexical 
effects in autism. Therefore, this possibility is examined by the auditory lexical 
decision task in which accuracy and reaction time are considered. In this auditory 
lexical decision task, the results point out that participants’ performance on accuracy 
are almost over 90 % and both accuracy and reaction time are not correlated to their 
log mean shift or total AQ score. That is, participants’ lexical knowledge may not 
differ from each other on the basis of different autistic traits. Moreover, due to the 
phenomenon that participants considered many nonwords in lexical decision task 
were legal words in their dialects, another possibility that may also affect lexical 
decision and attenuate the expected lexical effects in the previous word-to-nonword 
identification task is regarded. Those 48 tokens of words and nonwords are displayed 
in the questionnaire in which participants are asked to choose whether each token 
belong to real word, or nonword in Chinese Mandarin. As for those nonwords in the 
lexical decision task, participants regarded some nonwords were real words in lexical 
decision task, while they indicated those errors themselves made were nonwords in 
questionnaire. That is to say, the errors they made were likely to be due to mistakes, 
not the influences from their dialects. Furthermore, those two stimuli, ‘tie2’ (the 
nonword in die2-tie2 continuum), ‘diao2’ (nonword in diao2-tiao2 continuum) were 
also examined to see whether participants’ dialects may affect their decision to make 
those nonwords to be real words. Taken together those results of 17 participants, they 




5. General discussion and conclusion 
5.1 Discussion 
      Taken together, the three experiments (identification task, auditory sensitivity 
task and lexical decision task) presented above suggest that other extraneous factors 
do not affect participants’ lexical context effects and that the relationship between 
lexical context effects and ‘attention to detail’ has a significant result.  
According to the results from auditory sensitivity (by nonword ABX 
discrimination) and lexical knowledge (by auditory lexical decision), the possible 
factors that may reduce lexical effects in autism can be ruled out. It is due to the fact 
that firstly nonword ABX discrimination is neither correlated to AQ score nor log 
mean shift; namely, the score of nonword ABX discrimination does not increase or 
decrease because of different AQ score or lexical effects. Therefore, high AQ 
individuals may not exhibit high auditory sensitivity which potentially attenuates 
lexical effects in speech perception. Similarly, there is also no correlation whether 
between auditory lexical decision and AQ or between auditory lexical decision and 
lexical effects. It may suggest that listeners’ lexical knowledge here is less likely to 
affect lexical status. As the result, since those factors can be ruled out, we can put our 
focus on the results from lexical effects on speech perception in autism.  
     This present study suggests that one characteristic in autism, ‘attention to detail’ 
of AQ is associated with context lexical effects in phonetic perception. A negative 
correlation is found between them, meaning that individuals who tend to focus more 
on the smaller part of an object would be less affected by lexical knowledge when 
receiving sounds that are ambiguous to them. This result is consistent with the weak 
central coherence (Frith, 1989b). The data from the present experiment therefore 
suggests that individuals with fewer tendencies on details are more likely to adopt 
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more top-down strategy, lexical effects (Ganong, 1980), whereas people with higher 
tendencies on details are less influenced by this Ganong effect. Therefore one thing 
that is clear from the correlation between ‘attention to detail’ and lexical effects is that 
this tendency on a bottom-up strategy is a consequence of weak central coherence.  
      However, except ‘attentions to details’, the other four aspects of characteristics 
in AQ (social skills, communication, imagination and attention switching) are not 
correlated to lexical effects. It is therefore worth considering what this discrepancy 
implies. A potentially useful way of thinking about this discrepancy is to focus on the 
fact that different domains of AQ, including ‘social skill’, ‘communication’, 
‘imagination’, ‘attention to detail’ and ‘attention switching’ stand for what kind of 
areas of behavior in autism. It may be the case that these five subsections of AQ 
demonstrate divergent aspects of the autism syndrome so that any relationship 
between ‘attention to detail’ and the other four can not be found. In other words, it can 
be assumed that this partial correlation (a negative correlation between ‘attention to 
detail’ and lexical effects) presented here means that the extent to which individuals 
with autistic traits adopt top-down strategy (Ganong effect) is just associated to one 
aspect of autistic traits, ‘attention to detail’. As mentioned above, this tendency of 
focusing on details is a result of a central coherence bias in autism. One can therefore 
view this partial correlation as a test of the relationship between weak central 
coherence and lexical effects in speech perception; that is, ‘attention to details’ can be 
seen as a representation of WCC in people with autistic traits.  
Another concern has been raised about whether the other four domains belong 
to WCC or not. If they do belong to WCC, how come the correlations between lexical 
effects and those four can not be observed as it does in ‘attention to details’? However, 
if those four do not belong to WCC, what kind of accounts in autism can explain 
those domains? Firstly, we can see what kind of questions AQ is made of. AQ is 
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composed of five domains in which those items are selected from the ‘triad’ of autistic 
symptoms: socialization, communication and imagination (APA, 1994; Rutter, 1978; 
Wing and Gould, 1979) and from cognitive abnormality in autism: attention to details 
and attention switching (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin and Clubley, 
2001). Of those five domains, ‘attention to detail’ has been suggested above to be a 
demonstration of WCC (e.g. ‘I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, rather 
than the small details’, ‘I don’t usually notice small changes in a situation, or a 
person’s appearance’ or ‘ I usually notice car number plates or similar strings of 
information’).  
As for ‘attention switching’, the impairment of executive function has been 
reported to be able to account for the cognitive abnormality in this area of autism 
(Turner, 1997). It is due to the fact that autistic individuals fail to regulate or control 
volitional acts so that they sometimes produce repetitive or embarrassed behaviors. In 
other words, autistic people are less able to trigger ‘start’ and ‘stop’ in ongoing actions 
at will (impairment of inhibitory actions) and therefore they have more problems in 
cognitive flexibility (Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers, 1991) This lack of cognitive 
flexibility, shifting from previous attention to anything else, is therefore likely to be 
the account of poor attention-switching in autism. Specifically, a study into autism has 
also confirmed that autistic individuals are more likely to produce errors in 
set-shifting task (Hughes, Russel, and Robbins, 1994). This task requires participants 
to discriminate two pink geometrical shapes in which only shapes are different. Those 
participants are asked to learn a rule in order to respond to the target stimulus; after 
participants achieve six successive correct responses, they are introduced a reverse 
learnt rule and requested to respond to the previously incorrect stimulus. In the 
following stages, although participants must little by little learn new contingency with 
an additional dimension (while lines), they are still asked to focus on the questions in 
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the same dimension, shape. In the final extradimnesional shift stage (EDS), the new 
contingency this time, by contrast, is derived from the line dimension. Therefore, 
participants have to neglect the shape stimuli and instead focus on which of the white 
stimuli are the new target ones at this stage. This stage is also the one that examines 
whether the subject is able to make an extradimensional shift of attentional set from 
shapes to lines. The results, suggesting that autistic subjects are less likely to 
successfully switch the focus of their attention from one dimension (i.e. shapes) to 
another (i.e. lines) and make more errors than the chronological and mental age 
matched control ones, are consistent with a failure of inhibition (one of the executive 
functions) in autism.             
The rest of the subsections of AQ, ‘social skill’, ‘communication’ and 
‘imagination’ are triad of autistic symptoms in which theory of mind (ToM) is 
proposed to account for many of those behavioral symptoms (Jarrold, Bulter, 
Cottington and Jimenez, 2000). It is due to the fact that autistic individuals lack the 
understanding that another person’s mental state can be different from his / her own. It 
is therefore argued that this theory-of-mind deficit in autism results in social 
withdrawal/ poor social skills (Baron-Cohen, 1992, 1995; Frith, 1989b). Additionally, 
impairments in social interaction like this would lead to lower motivation for 
communication (Frith 1989a; Happé, 1993). Finally, deficits in imagination (at least 
pretend play) would also result from a theory-of-mind deficit since Leslie (1987) has 
proposed that pretend play requires the representation of another people’s mental 
state.  
Since these five subsections of AQ can be regarded to derive from these three 
psychological explanations, theory of mind (for ‘social skill’, ‘communication’ and 
‘imagination’), executive dysfunction (for ‘attention switching’) and weak central 
coherence (for ‘attention to detail’), an important question is whether these three 
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accounts of autism are related. It has been proposed by Happé (1999) that the deficit 
accounts, including theory of mind and executive dysfunction can not explain the 
excellent behaviors in autism, but weak central bias does. This suggests that there 
might be no close relationship between weak central coherence and those deficit 
accounts. In other words, these accounts of assets and deficits in autism have been 
viewed as being complementary in explaining the different syndromes of autism. 
Moreover, according to the statistical result presented in the previous chapter, it 
indicates that the deficit accounts, theory of mind and executive dysfunction (in 
‘social skill’, ‘communication’ vs. ‘attention switching’) are almost positively 
correlated (see Table 8). On the other hand, Table 8 also shows that ‘attention to 
detail’ which can be seen as one kind of weak central coherence, does not have any 
close relationship with other four subsections (‘social skill’, ‘communication’, 
‘imagination’ and ‘attention switching’), which can be seen as the representation of 
those deficit accounts (theory of mind and executive dysfunction). Those statistical 
results from Table 8 are consistent with the dissociation claimed by Happé, (1999) 
that ‘theory of mind’ and ‘executive dysfunction’ are psychological explanations that 
can account for the impairments of autism, whereas ‘weak central coherence’ is able 










Table 8.  Correlations between the demonstration of ‘theory of mind’, 






























Particularly, two domains— central coherence bias (the asset account) and 
theory of mind (the deficit account)—have been typically considered to be separate 
(Frith and Happé, 1994; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1987; Leslie and Roth 1993; 
Leslie and Thaiss, 1992). This claim proposed by those authors is due to two 
theoretical reasons. First, Baron-Cohen (1995) and Leslie (1987; Leslie and Roth 
1993; Leslie and Thaiss, 1992) claimed that theory of mind is one kind of ‘modular’ 
ability; that is, an ability underlying the functioning of a fixed neural system (Fodor, 
1983). It is said that modular systems are domain specific and the working of a 
modular system is automatic and not supposed to be influenced by top-down 
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processing from any other system. As a result, from this theoretical viewpoint, the 
functioning of theory-of-mind should not be connected to other domains; in other 
words, theory-of-mind is an independent working system that should be separate from 
weak central processing in autism. Second, Frith and Happé (1994) also showed their 
agreement with the above claim in that these two accounts seem to explain divergent 
aspects of autism: theory of mind is for the triad features of autism, while weak 
central coherence is about the nontriad top-down processing. Moreover, this claim has 
received a number of empirical reasons for regarding that theory of mind and weak 
central coherence are distinct areas of autism. It was found that some autistic 
individuals pass the task that requires more complex second-order theory of mind 
(which is about appreciation of beliefs), but still present weak central bias (Happé, 
1994b, 1997). Taking those arguments outlined above together, it can be concluded 
that the asset account (weak central coherence) may not be linked to the deficit ones 
(theory of mind and executive dysfunction). Therefore, it is not surprising that lexical 
effects of this present study as one kind of central coherence does not correlate with 
‘social skill’, ‘communication’, ‘imagination’ (the representation of impaired mind 
reading) and ‘attention switching’ (the demonstration of executive dysfunction) that 
are all belonging to deficit accounts of autism.  
Although this suggests that the asset account and deficit account of autism are 
distinct (which is accord to the result of the present study), it should be noted that 
some researchers proposed the possible link between impairment of global 
information processing and the social deficits in autism (Jarrold, Bulter, Cottington 
and Jimenez, 2000). In order to figure out this dissimilarity from the result of the 
present experiment, we should focus our attention on their methodology. In Jarrold et 
al. (2000), these authors tried to examine the potential link between theory of mind 
and central coherence bias in which they chose an eye-reading task (Baron-Cohen, 
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Jolliffe, et al., 1997) and Embedded Figures Test (Witkin et al., 1971)/ block design 
test as the index of theory of mind and central coherence bias respectively. Three 
experiments were conducted to see the extend to which normal adults, normally 
developing children and autistic children may show the correlated results between the 
eye-reading task (for theory of mind) and Embedded Figures Test (weak central 
coherence). In experiment 1, sixty normal adults presented that the individuals who 
did better performance on an eye-reading tests took longer time on locating a target 
figure in a series of complex drawings. Additionally, in experiment 2, twenty-four 
normally developing children demonstrated the same performance in which they were 
assessed with a series of theory-of-mind tasks, such as inferred belief, not-won belief, 
explicit false belief (Wellman and Bartsch, 1988), own false belief (Perner et al., 
1987), other’s false belief and second-order false belief (Perner and Wimmer, 1985), 
and with two tests of child version, the Embeded Figures Test (Coates, 1972) and 
block design test as the index of weak central coherence. Similarly, results from 
seventeen autistic children in experiment 3 represented the negative relationship 
between theory of mind and block design score, as well as the positive correlation 
between theory of mind and Embedded Figures Test time when the verbal mental age 
was accounted for. Taken together, these consequences from three kinds of 
participants (normally developing adults, children and autistic children) indicated that 
an inverse relationship between performance on the tasks of theory of mind and on 
tests of central coherence bias was observed.  
Nevertheless, although a link between theory-of-mind impairments and central 
coherence bias has been evidenced in Jarrold, et al., (2000), a concern is raised:  
‘does this necessarily mean that individuals with weak central coherence have poorer 
theory-of-mind deficits?’ Does that mean a casual relationship exists between the 
asset (central coherence bias) and deficit (theory of mind) account? If so, the question 
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we should pay attention to is why there can not be found the same results in the 
present experiment. Consequentially, two equally important questions are worth 
considering about whether these two kinds of tests, Embedded Figures test and block 
design test in Jarrold, et al., (2000) can really stand for the whole underlying 
mechanism of top-down processing (weak central coherence) in autism and whether 
there is any limitation of the methodology in the present experiment. The former 
question is discussed in the following part and the latter problem of limitation will be 
presented in the next section. 
Embedded Figures test and block design test have been taken as accepted 
measures of weak central coherence, in that these tasks require participants to use a 
local visual processing approach. Besides, according to the results in Jarrold, et al. 
(2000), the performance on Embedded Figures test was highly correlated to the 
performance on block design test and these two tasks were both negatively correlated 
to theory of mind as well. It may therefore imply that Embedded Figures test and 
block design test tap the same underlying processing. However, although the 
performance on these two visual tasks show the same detail-focusing strategy in 
autism, can it predict that other central coherence bias at different domains, such as 
auditory or verbal-semantic ones, is also related to theory of mind? Would it be 
possible that although these visuospatial-constructional coherence, Embedded Figures 
test and block design test (Happé, 1999) are indeed correlated with visual eye-reading 
or other theory-of-mind tasks, other levels of weak central coherence (such as 
perceptual and verbal-semantic coherence) in autism are not found to be related to the 
visually theory-of-mind tasks?  
Consequentially, one can argue that poorer theory-of-mind performance does 
not necessarily predict the weak central coherence, which is consistent with the result 
of current experiment. Although Jarrold, et al. (2000) provide evidence for a link 
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between theory of mind and weak central coherence, these authors only use the cues 
from visual stimuli where the issue that visual performance can necessarily predict 
other domains remains unclear. In other words, they do not clearly offer the 
explanation on the nature of the association between theory of mind and weak central 
coherence.  
Moreover, in the current experiment, this top-down auditory speech processing 
can be seen as one type of demonstration of weak central coherence at both the 
domains of the verbal-semantic and perceptual. As a result, this also raises the 
concern about whether the performance of central coherence bias on these domains in 
the current experiment is necessarily correlated to visual theory-of-mind tasks in 
Jarrold et al. Therefore, one thing that is more clear from Jarrrold, et al. and also from 
the present experiment, is that it seems more likely that there may be a link between 
the performance on Embedded Figures test and block design test and on eye-reading 
task, but it may be too early to make the conclusion that there is indeed a link between 
weak central coherence (an asset account) and theory of mind (a deficit account). In 
order to confirm the nature of the association between theory of mind and weak 
central coherence, additional experiments at different domains (i.e. perceptual and 
verbal-semantic ones) in the future should be done.  
 
5.2 Limitation of the present experiment and future work 
     The relationship between top-down Ganong effect in the present study is 
observed to be negatively correlated to ‘attention to detail’ as a consequence of weak 
central coherence, suggesting that people who tend to adopt local processing are less 
likely to shift their phonetic categorization from nonword to words when listening to 
ambiguous stimuli. However, it should be noted that this evidence of partially 
correlated result in the current experiment seems not yet to imply that there will be a 
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casual relationship between Ganong effect and autism. One thing that is clear from 
this present result is that the top-down lexical processing (Ganong effect) can only 
show the individuals’ local-detailed preference, which is just part of the feature in 
autism. Accordingly, further work is clearly needed in order to explore their 
relationship in more detail. 
Of the present methodology, two aspects are worth considering making some 
adjustment in the future work: one is the possible limitation of AQ test and the other is 
the type of population. Indeed, the AQ can distinguish people with autism from 
normal population (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin and Clubley, 2001) 
and the inverse relationship between ‘attention to detail’ and context lexical effect is 
also observed in the current experiment. However, in order to validate more about the 
inverse relationship between this Ganong effect and the central coherence bias in 
autism, we can adopt more typical measures (such as Embedded Figure Test (Witkin 
et al., 1971), the block design task (Shah and Frith, 1993), the pronunciation of 
homographs (Frith and Snowling, 1983) or dot counting (Jarrold and Russell, 
1997)…etc.) as the index of the degree of central coherence bias and see if the close 
relationship indeed exhibits between weak central coherence and this top-down 
Ganing effect. If correct, then the claim that an individual who tends to adopt the 
more local processing is less likely to be influenced by lexical effects would be more 
evidenced. Moreover, this study suggests the local processing strategy in 
neurotypicals, but we still can not generalize this current finding. So, further 







 In this present study, one kind of top-down auditory perception, Ganong effect, 
is employed to examine its relationship with autistic traits. This effect suggests that 
people are likely to choose the real words (i.e. the influence of lexical status on 
phonetic categorization) when they are listening to the ambiguous stimuli that sound 
either words or nonwords (such as ‘kiss’ or ‘giss’). Additionally, the previous study in 
autism has been suggested that people with autism are more likely to focus on the 
detail so that they may show the relatively poorer central coherence (such as 
Embedded Figure Test or the block design task). The findings from the present study 
are consistent with the previous research of weak central coherence in that individuals 
with higher score on ‘attention to detail’ tend not to shift their auditory categorization 
from nonwords to words. Therefore, it supports the theory of central coherence bias 
that people with autism are more likely to adopt the detail-focused strategy.  
However, the results of the current experiment only show the partial correlation 
between context lexical effects and ‘attention to detail’ indicating the discrepancy 
between those five subsections of AQ (‘social skill’, ‘communication’, ‘imagination’, 
‘attention switching’ and ‘attention to detail’). What we consider is whether those five 
subsections are related to each other. If not, one may not be surprised by the result that 
top-down local processing is not related to the rest of the subsections. As described in 
the general discussion, three psychological explanations of autism can account for 
those five subsections. The social triad, ‘social skill’, ‘communication’ and 
‘imagination’ can be seen as the demonstration of theory of mind, while ‘attention 
switching’ can be considered to stem from executive functioning. Finally, ‘attention to 
detail’ is regarded to be from weak central coherence.  
Those three accounts of autism have been seen as describing different aspects 
of the autism syndrome. Specifically, Happé (1999) proposed that weak central 
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coherence can account for the peculiar perceptual-cognitive style of autism, while the 
other two, theory of mind and executive dysfunction point out the deficits of social 
cognition and executive function in autism. In other words, those three accounts can 
be seen as being complementary in explaining the nature of autism; those accounts 
(between deficit and assets) may not show close relationship with each other. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the results from the current experiment are 
consistent with this partial association. Specifically, the originally expected inverse 
relationship between context lexical effects and those four subsections (‘social skill’, 
‘communication’, ‘imagination’ and ‘attention switching’) of AQ is not observed. In 
addition, since each of those four subsections are all highly correlated to total AQ 
score, it is not surprising that we can not observe significant correlation between total 
AQ score and context lexical effects of the current experiment, whereas the result 
from the present experiment is only correlated to ‘attention to detail’, which can be 
seen as the consequence of weak central coherence.  
      Nevertheless, there remains further work to be done in this area to confirm 
whether a close inverse relationship between context lexical effects and weak central 
conference indeed exists. Adjustments to the method need to be made in the aspects of 
the index of the degree of weak central coherence and the population of clinically 
autistic people in order to carry out the research where the relationship between this 
context lexical effect of the present experiment and central coherence bias of autism is 
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   7.1   AQ  
1. I prefer to do things with others rather than 





















3. If I try to imagine something, I find it very 










4. I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one 





















6. I usually notice car number plates or similar 










7. Other people frequently tell me that what 











8. When I’m reading a story, I can easily 





















10. In a social group, I can easily keep track of 






















































15. I find myself drawn more strongly to people 












16. I tend to have very strong interests, which I 























18. When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to 





















20. When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult 

































































26. I frequently find that I don’t know how to 










27. I find it easy to “read between the lines” 










28. I usually concentrate more on the whole 





















30. I don’t usually notice small changes in a 










31. I know how to tell if someone listening to 
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33. When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when 

































36. I find it easy to work out what someone is 











37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back 





















39. People often tell me that I keep going on and 










40. When I was young, I used to enjoy playing 











41. I like to collect information about categories 
of things (e.g. types of car, types of bird, 










42. I find it difficult to imagine what it would be 
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49. I am not very good at remembering people’s 









50. I find it very easy to play games with 









 MRC-SBC/SJW Feb 1998 
S. Baron-Cohen, S. Wheelwright, R. Skinner, J. Martin and E. Clubley, (2001), The Adult Autism 
Spectrum Quotient (AQ), Autism Research Center, University of Cambridge, UK; (Journal of Autism 
and Developmental Disorders 31: 5-17); Mandarin Version: M. J. Liu (2006), Department of Special 
Education, National Kaohsiung Normal University, Taiwan, Mail: mj@nknucc.nknu.edu.tw 
The Adult Autism Spectrum Quotient  
AQ test 成人版 (16歲以上適用) 
 
說明： 




1. 我樂於冒風險。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
2.  我喜歡玩棋盤遊戲(如：西洋棋、象 
棋、或大富翁等)。  
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
3. 學習彈奏樂器對我而言很容易。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
4. 我對外國或其他的文化著迷。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 





完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
2. 我比較喜歡一直沿用同樣的方法
來做事情。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
3. 當我試著想像某事時，我腦海中很 
容易就出現畫面。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
4. 我經常太強烈地投入於一件事，而 
忽略了其他的事情。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
5. 我經常注意到別人沒察覺到的微
小聲音。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
6. 我常注意車子的車牌或類似的一
連串的訊息。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 




完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
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8. 當我閱讀故事時，我可以輕易地想
像故事人物的樣子。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
9. 我對日期著迷。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
10. 在社交聚會中，我可以輕易地保持
對不同的人的談話內容的注意力。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
11. 參與社交場合對我而言很容易。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
12. 我傾向注意別人沒察覺到的細節。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 




完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
14. 瞎編故事對我而言很容易。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
15. 我發現自己對於人的興趣遠超過
對於事情的興趣。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 




完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
17. 我喜愛社交閒談。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
18. 當我說話時，別人不是很容易能插
得上話。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
19. 我對數字著迷。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
20. 當我閱讀故事時，去猜測故事中人
物的意圖對我而言很困難。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
21. 我並不特別喜愛閱讀小說。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
22. 交新朋友對我而言很困難。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
23. 我總是會注意各種事物的模式。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
24. 與其去博物館，我還比較喜歡去戲
院。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
25. 如果我每天的生活作息被打亂
了，我也不會生氣。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
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26. 我經常發現我不知如何使對話持
續下去。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
27. 當有人跟我說話時，我能很輕易地
察覺言外之意。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
28. 我通常比較專注於大局，而非小細
節。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
29. 我不擅長記住電話號碼。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
30. 我通常不會注意到環境中或是人
的外表的細微改變。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
31. 我知道如何辨別別人是否已厭倦
聽我說話。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
32. 同時做兩樣以上的事情對我來說
是容易的。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
33. 當我講電話時，我不太確定什麼時
候該我接話。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
34. 我喜愛隨興地做事情。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
35. 我常常是最後一個理解笑話中笑
點的人。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
36. 我可以看別人的表情就輕易地猜
出他們的想法或感覺。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
37. 當被打擾後，我可以很快地轉換回
被打擾前在做的事。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
38. 我擅長社交閒談。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
39. 別人常告訴我我總是重複地說同
樣的事。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
40. 兒童時期我喜愛與玩伴玩假裝性
質的遊戲。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 




完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
42. 我很難去想像成為另外一個人是
什麼樣子。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
43. 我喜歡仔細地計劃我參與的任何
一項活動。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
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44. 我喜愛社交場合。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
45. 猜測別人的意圖對我而言很困難。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
46. 新的局勢會讓我焦慮。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
47. 我喜愛認識新朋友。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
48. 我是個善於交際的人。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
49. 我不擅長記住別人的生日。 完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
50. 跟兒童玩假裝性質的遊戲對我而
言很容易。 
完全     稍微    稍微      完全 
同意     同意   不同意    不同意 
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       國語裡有這個字                無此字  
              (word)         (nonword) 
 
 
ㄊ一ㄥˊ                  
 
ㄐ一ㄢˋ                     
 
ㄉ一ㄡˊ                  
 
ㄉㄨㄤˇ                     
 
ㄅ一ㄚˊ                  
 
ㄆ一ㄝˊ                  
 
ㄅㄚˇ                   
 
ㄆㄚˇ                   
 
ㄆ一ㄚˊ                  
 
ㄉ一ㄠˊ                  
 
ㄊㄨㄟˇ                  
 
ㄉㄨㄟˇ                  
 
ㄒ一ㄤˇ                  
 
ㄍ一ˊ                   
  
ㄉ一ㄡˊ                  
 
ㄊ一ㄡˊ                  
 
ㄎㄚˇ                   
 
ㄍㄚˇ                   
 
ㄍㄨㄟˊ                  
 




ㄎㄞ                    
 
ㄊㄨㄤˇ                  
 
ㄍㄥˋ                   
 
ㄎㄨㄟˊ                  
 
ㄍㄨㄛˊ                  
 
ㄎㄨㄛˊ                  
 
ㄉ一ㄝˊ                  
 
ㄉㄨㄟˋ                  
 
ㄍㄨㄟˋ                  
 
ㄓㄚˋ                   
 
ㄋ一ㄢˊ                  
 
ㄈㄟ                    
 
ㄍ一ㄢˋ                  
 
ㄎ一ㄢˋ                  
 
ㄅ一ㄡˊ                  
 
ㄍㄥˋ                   
 
ㄐ一ˊ                   
 
ㄊㄨㄥˋ                  
 
ㄊ一ㄡˊ                  
 
ㄆ一ㄡˊ                  
 
ㄅ一ㄝˊ                  
 
ㄊ一ㄠˊ                  
 
ㄊ一ㄝˊ                  
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ㄎ一ㄚˋ                     
 
ㄆ一ㄢˊ                     
 
ㄅ一ㄢˊ                     
 
ㄆ一ㄥˊ                     
 
ㄅ一ㄥˊ                     
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